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CHAPTER 10 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS ]. NICHOLSON, S.]. 
§lO.l. Service in diversity cases: Federal or state practice. The 
Erie rule governing choice of law in diversity jurisdiction cases is still 
marked by ambiguity of meaning and difficulty of application. The 
United States Supreme Court has attempted to ameliorate the situ-
ation in Hanna v. Plumer.! 
The plaintiff, a citizen of Ohio, filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the 
executor, residing in Massachusetts, of a deceased Massachusetts resi-
dent. The suit was for damages for personal injuries resulting from 
an automobile accident in South Carolina allegedly caused by the 
negligence of the Massachusetts decedent. 
Service was made upon the defendant by leaving copies of the 
summons and the complaint at his residence with his wife, in com-
pliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(I).2 A Massachu-
setts statute provides, however, that an executor need not answer suits 
unless in-hand service is made upon him or notice of the action is 
filed in the proper registry of probate within one year of his giving 
bond.s The defendant, accordingly, answered that the action could 
not be maintained because it had been brought in violation of this 
statute. The district court granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that the adequacy of the service was to be 
measured by Section 9, with which the plaintiff had not complied. 
On appeal, the plaintiff admitted noncompliance with Section 9, but 
argued that Rule 4(d)(I) defines the method by which service of process 
is to be effected in diversity actions. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, finding that "relatively recent amend-
ments [to Section 9] evince a clear legislative purpose to require per-
sonal notification within the year," concluded that the conflict of 
state and federal rules was over "a substantive rather than a pro-
cedural matter," and unanimously affirmed.4 
Since the service requirements in a number of states would not 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J., is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School and a member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars. 
§10.1. 11180 U.S. 460, 85 Sup. Ct. 11116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965). 
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(I) provides that service shall be made "upon an individual 
other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons 
and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling 
ho,!~ or usua~ place .. of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then 
reSIdmg therem .... 
S G.L., c. 197, §9. Section 9 is in part a statute of limitation. This part of the 
statute was not involved in the case since the action was timely commenced . 
• Hanna v. Plumer, lIlIl F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964). 
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necessarily be satisfied by compliance with Rule 4(d)(I), the decision 
of the appellate court posed a threat to the goal of uniformity of 
federal procedure. The United States Supreme Court, accordingly, 
granted certiorari.5 A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren, held that the adoption of Rule 4(d)(I), designed to 
control service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded the 
congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor trans-
gressed constitutional bounds, and that the Federal Rule was the 
standard against which the district court should have measured the 
adequacy of the service. The Court therefore reversed the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
This case presents a conflict between the policy favoring uniformity 
of federal procedure and the policy of insuring that the outcome of 
a litigation in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction shall 
be substantially the same as it would be if tried in a state court. 
One of the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to 
bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from 
local rules. These Rules were promulgated by the United States 
Supreme Court pursuant to a congressional Enabling Act which au-
thorizes the Court to prescribe rules for the "practice and procedure 
of the district courts of the United States in civil actions."6 The 
Enabling Act contains the limitation that the rules "shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right .... " The year 1938, in 
which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, was also 
the year in which the Erie rule had its birth. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,7 
overruling Swift v. Tyson,8 held that the Rules of Decision ActO re-
quires federal courts in diversity cases, when deciding nonfederal 
issues of substantive law, to follow state court decisions as well as 
state statutes. 
The question of how procedural law is to be distinguished from 
substantive law thus became pertinent in view of the mandate in 
Erie and of the Enabling Act's limitation. The Supreme Court at-
tempted to draw the line in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York10 when it 
held that the policy in Erie requires a federal court to follow the state 
rule whenever disregarding it would substantially affect the outcome 
of the case. The York "outcome-determinative" test made it clear that 
Erie-type problems were not to be solved by reference to any tradi-
tional substance-procedure distinction. As a result federal courts have 
been forced to follow state law with respect to matterS which for other 
purposes are often treated as procedural.ll 
5379 U.S. 813, 85 Sup. Ct. 52, 13 L. Ed.2d 27 (1964). 
628 U.S.C. §2072 (1964). 
7304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). 
841 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842). 
028 U.S.C. §1652 (1964). 
10 326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945). 
11 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 
2079 (1945) (statute of limitations); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &: Warehouse Co .. 
337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949) (the commencement of lawsuits 
for purposes of tolling statutes of limitations). 
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In the present case the defendant argued that the Erie-York doc-
trine acts as a check on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; that, 
despite the clear command of Rule 4(d)(1), Erie and its offspring de-
mand the application of the Massachusetts rule. The Court summa-
rized the defendant's argument as follows: 
Reduced to essentials, the argument is: 
(1) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply 
state law whenever application of federal law in its stead will alter 
the outcome of the case. (2) In this case, a determination that the 
Massachusetts service requirements obtain will result in immedi-
ate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should be held 
that Rule 4(d)(I) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with 
possible victory for petitioner. (3) Therefore, Erie demands appli-
cation of the Massachusetts rule.12 
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elee. Coop.13 the Supreme Court had 
retreated from the York "outcome-determinative" test. In that case the 
Court ruled that although a state rule must be applied if it is an "in-
tegral part" of a substantive state right, in other instances of federal-
state conflict a balancing of federal and state policies should deter-
mine whether state law controls. In the present case the Court, in 
rejecting the defendant's argument, referred to the Byrd decision and 
reiterated its holding that "outcome" is not the only consideration in 
deciding whether a federal court should follow state practice. The 
"outcome-determinative" test, the Court continued, must be read in 
the context of the twin aims of the Erie doctrine: discouragement of 
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
law. Concededly, the choice of the federal or state rule would have a 
marked effect upon the outcome of the present case, and the same 
could be said of every procedural variation, no matter how trivial. 
The Court concluded, however, that permitting service of the defen-
dant's wife to take the place of in-hand service of the defendant 
himself did not raise the sort of equal protection problems with which 
Erie was concerned, and that the difference between the two rules was 
not relevant to the choice of a forum.14 
The Court also disagreed with the defendant's assumption that the 
Erie-York doctrine constitutes the appropriate test of the validity and 
therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The 
scope of the Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal 
Rules must be judged in light of the constitutional provision for a 
federal court system, which carries with it congressional power to 
make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts. 
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power 
of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts 
even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from com-
12380 U.S. 460, 466, 85 Sup. Ct. 1136, 1141, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8, 12 (1965). 
13356 U.S. 525, 78 Sup. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953 (1958). 
14380 U.S. 460, 467-469, 85 Sup. Ct. 1136, 1141-1143, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8, 13 (1965). 
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parable state rules .... To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of 
enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the 
Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' 
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act. Rule 4(d)(I) 
is valid and controls the instant case.15 
The present decision brings welcome clarification to the Erie doc-
trine as a choice of law rule in diversity actions. The Court's opinion 
does not remove all ambiguity from the Erie distinction between sub-
stance and procedure but, by underscoring what might be called the 
Byrd approach, it emphasizes the proper allocation of judicial power 
between the state and federal systems. Erie correctly commands that 
state law govern affairs which the Constitution leaves to state regula-
tion. But the Constitution also gives Congress the power to provide 
uniform procedural law for the federal courts. The Court's decision, 
in holding that the Erie-York policy does not mean a mechanical fol-
lowing of state practice, properly reserves a legitimate federal interest 
to federal regulation. The evident intent of the Massachusetts rule is 
to permit an executor to distribute the estate which he is administer-
.ing without fear that further liabilities may be outstanding for which 
he could be held personally liable. Service of process, as defined by 
Rule 4(d)(I), would have no substantial effect upon the speed and 
assurance with which estates are distributed. The application of Rule 
4(d)(l) did not, therefore, contravene Massachusetts policy and it pro-
motes the goal of uniform procedure in the federal courts. 
§IO.2. Contributory negligence: Substance and procedure. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has applied Mas-
sachusetts choice of law rules in Independent Nail and Packing Co. v. 
Mitchell.1 
The plaintiff Mitchell brought a diversity action against the defen-
dant corporation in the United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts. The plaintiff had been assisting in the construction 
of a bam in Illinois, using nails manufactured by the defendant. As 
Mitchell struck a nail with a hammer a portion of it broke off and 
struck him, blinding him in one eye. The plaintiff's suit for damages 
for personal injury relied upon claims in both breach of warranty and 
negligence. The district court granted the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict on the breach of warranty claim and the case was sub-
mitted to the jury on the negligence issue. The court entered judg-
ment on the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. 
The court of appeals, in the present case, affirmed the judgment of 
the dist~ict court, h?lding that whether the plaintiff had been guilty 
of contributory neghgence and whether the defendant had negligently 
caused the failure of the nail through improper manufacture were 
questions for the jury. 
15Id. at 4711-474, 85 Sup. Ct. at 1145, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 16. 
§10.2. 111411 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965). 
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Since jurisdiction in this case was based upon diversity. of citizen-
ship, the court of appeals noted initially that the Erie doctrine re-
quired it to apply the conflict of law rules that would be applied by 
Massachusetts courts.2 Established Massachusetts conflicts law in the 
torts field, fQ.}t()wiIlg..the customaryslJQ~tance-pr()ceclyre -il1JU:l!~~li~~_ 
tion~ was to the effect that the law of the place of the wroIlg-E92'~!".!!~<! 
!Ill!~~f!!~._or~~bstanceSand that thf! law oL!...1!e. fo!"_u!ll.s.()p.tr~!!ed pro~: 
dural issues.4 The law of Illinois, the place of the injury, therefore ap-
plied as to the substantive rights of the parties. The matter of burden 
of proof of contributory negligence is ordinarily treated as proce-
dural.1I Massachusetts law therefore governed the burden of proof of 
contributory negligence, and in this Commonwealth the burden of 
proof rests upon the defendant.6 
The court of appeals also considered another procedural aspect of 
contributory negligence - wh~J.herJ under Maas.adms.e.tts. standards.7Jt 
was proper to s!lbrnit to the jury theques~i()l!.QLcQnt!"JR.l!!...ory neg!k 
gence: In applying the Massachusetts rule placing the burden of proof 
of contributory negligence upon the defendant, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts has evidenced a liberality in leaving the ques-
tio .. n ... of con.tribut.o. ry .. n. e.g. 1 .. igen. ce ... to. t.h ..e .. J.'u .. ry.8. T ... h.e .. cou. rt.of ap. peals.coIl_) ~JlJ.ded __ th_<ltMa_ss<.u::l:!llse~ts law wan:anted the _submissiQn. QLtllli.is.sue 
t() !.I!~.i!!IT_'!I1:9-__ !hCl.!,(m the facts, the jury WCls.en.t!tlf!cl.toJind for the 
plaintiff on the questions of cQn~!iP.lJtory l],~gligel],q~ _al!cl_.U~P.i.li!}'. .. 
The Massachusetts rules applied in the present case under the Erie 
mandate represent traditional choice of law doctrine in this area of 
conflict of laws. Recent rejections of the substance-procedure dichot-
omy have been with a view to pennit the substantive law of the state, 
which has a significant relationship with the transaction, to govern 
the rights of the parties. There has been no disposition to redefine 
"matters of procedure." Practical necessity requires that the forum 
apply its own procedural rules including those relating to the burden 
of persuasion with respect to contributory negligence. Otherwise, the 
2 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 
1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941). 
S Medeiros v. Perry, 332 Mass. 158, 124 N.E.2d 240 (1955), noted in 1955 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §22.l; 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §33.1 n.l5. 
4 Gregory v. Maine Cent. R.R., 317 Mass. 636, 59 N.E.2d 471 (1945); Levy v. Steiger, 
233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919). 
II Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 149-152 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Leflar, Conflict of Laws 
115-116 (1959); Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §599c (Tent. Draft No. 11, 
1965). 
11 Gregory v. Maine Cent. R.R., 317 Mass. 636, 639-640, 59 N.E.2d 471, 474 (1945). 
The United States Supreme Court has held, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109,63 
Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943), that the question of burden of establishing con-
tributory negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of 
citizenship cases must apply. 
7 The law of the forum determines whether an issue shall be tried by the court 
or by a jury. Leflar, Conflict of Laws 111-112 (1959); Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
Second §594 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). 
8 See Potter v. John .Bean Div. of Food Mach. Be Chem. Corp., 344 Mass. 420, 182 
N.E.2d 834 (1962). 
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efficiency of judicial administration would be impaired. The present 
decision, therefore, as it relates to the issue of burden of proof of con-
tributory negligence, is in accord with current conflicts law. 
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Brogie v. Vogel9 also 
considered the substantive and procedural aspects of the issue of con-
tributory negligence. 
In Brogie the plaintiff, a resident of Massachusetts, sought to re-
cover for personal injuries incurred when, while a social guest, he fell 
down the cellar stairs in the defendants' house in New Hampshire. 
The accident occurred when the plaintiff hung his coat up behind a 
door in the dimly lighted kitchen. The door, instead of leading to a 
closet, led to the cellar stairs. The trial judge denied the defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict and the jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff. The defendants took exception to the denial of the motion 
for a directed verdict. 
The Court, applying applicable Massachusetts conflicts doctrine, 
held that the governing substantive la~w~ tll~of N~w Hampshir~. 
New Hampshire law determined whether til€!_ pl~!ntif!:.L~ondu(;Lc~!l­
st!t!!.t~c:l(;Ql!tributory negligence. The law of MassachusettsL!h~12!:um, 
_(:.QDJr9IJgcL tb~ pr.Q~ed lJ.K~l J!~p~~...-.CI.tJhe issl!~ __ ~L~o!l triQ.l:!!9fJr __ l!~E!!­
ence. 
The Court noted that New Hampshire substantive law was more 
favorable to the plaintiff's case than that of Massachusetts. New 
Hampshire law requires the owner of premises to give a social guest 
reasonable information as to existing dangerous conditions, not open 
to the latter's observation, of which the owner knows or should know.1° 
Massachusetts law imposes only a limited duty with respect to social 
guests, that is, to refrain from acts of gross negligence.11 The Court 
found that the circumstances in the case precluded the trial judge 
from ruling that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law,12 and that the jury was warranted in concluding that 
the plaintiff was not negligent in stepping into what appeared in the 
dim light to be a closet.1S The Court, therefore, overruled the defen-
dants' exception. 
§IO.3. Wrongful death action: State with most significant rela-
tionship. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has refused to apply the Massachusetts wrongful death statute in its 
entirety in Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Service, Inc.1 
91965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 383, 205 N.E.2d 234. 
10 See Hashim v. Chimiklis, 91 N.H. 456, 457, 21 A.2d 166, 167-168 (1941). 
11 See Callahan v. Boudreau, 345 Mass. 405, 406, 187 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1963); 
Pandiscio v. Bowen, 342 Mass. 435, 437, 173 N.E.2d 634, 635 (1961); O'Brien v. Shea, 
326 Mass. 681, 682, 96 N.E.2d 163, 164 (1951). 
12 See Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc., of Peabody, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1359, 202 N.E.2d 
771; Martin v. Reis, 344 Mass. 32, 37, 181 N.E.2d 580, 583-584 (1962). 
1S See Hubbard v. Palmer Russell Co., 343 Mass. 414, 416-417, 178 N.E.2d 869, 
870-.871 (1961); O'Brien v. Peterson, 329 Mass. 427, 430, 108 N.E.2d 538, 540 (1952). 
§10.3. 1342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965). The case involved two separate causes of 
action arising out of the death of two men in the same accident. 
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In Gianni, the plaintiff widows and administratrices brought diver-
sity suits in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana against the defendant company, an Indiana corporation 
with its principal office and place of business in that state. The plain-
tiffs sought damages under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute 
for the deaths of their husbands in an airplane crash in Massachusetts. 
The plaintiffs were residents of Connecticut. The alleged negligence 
in inspecting the airplane took place in Indiana._ 
The Massachusetts wrongful death statute requires that such actions 
shall be commenced within one year from the date of death.2 The In-
diana wrongful death act has a two-year limitation.s The suits in the 
present case were begun eighteen months after the accident. The dis-
trict court, ruling that the Massachusetts one-year limitation was to 
be applied, entered orders dismissing the complaints. 
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the actions were governed 
by the Indiana two-year limitation and reversed the orders of the dis-
trict court. The court of appeals, with respect to the reasons for its 
decision in Gianni, merely referred to its decision in Watts v. Pioneer 
Corn CO.,4 handed down the same day. 
The Watts case was a diversity action for wrongful death. The court 
of appeals held that where a Kentucky resident, whose beneficiaries 
were residents of Indiana, was killed in Illinois when his automobile 
collided with a truck owned by an Indiana corporation and driven by 
an Indiana resident, Indiana law and not Illinois law governed the 
amount of damages recoverable for the decedent's death. The court 
noted, on the evidence of recent cases from a variety of federal and 
state courts, that the traditional rules for choice of law in the tort area 
are being challenged. The current trend of decisions clearly indica_~s_ 
--1h<l:f:~e _familiar place-of-i!!!pacLrule i~-Ziyi~ID'_~q_Jhe. __ yj~\\T_th.a.t _ 
tJle_ su~stantiv~Jaw ~Lt_~_!t_~!~l!i£!! ___ ~~~_~!g~ifi~~n!_cont~cts with the 
transaction governs the rights of the parti~s~5 The court of appeals 
held, therefore, that although the "contacts" rule was not yet part of 
Indiana conflicts law as related to tort questions, the courts of Indiana 
would abandon the lex loci delicti principle and apply Indiana law t~ 
the issue of damages. On the facts, the state of Indiana had the more .J 
significant relationship to the case. 
In Gianni, with its incorporation of the rationale set forth in Watts, 
the federal court of appeals dealt with the Massachusetts wrongful 
death statute in the context of an interstate transaction, and it refused 
to apply the one-year limitation of that act. Indiana can now be added 
to the growing list of states that have abandoned the mechanical lex 
loci delicti approach in favor of the more flexible significant relation-
2 G.L.. c. 229, §2. 
S Burns Ind. Ann. Stat. §2-404. 
4342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965). 
5 See 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.1 for a lengthy consideration of this develop-
ment. with particular reference to the rejection of the damages provision of the 
Massachusetts wrongful death statute in the celebrated Pearson case. 
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ship rule accepted by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second.6 
The latter rule more surely safeguards the right of states to effectuate 
their own individual interests. If the Massachusetts statute applied, 
the Indiana public policy embodied in the two-year limitation would 
have been frustrated by the fortuitous occurrence of the airplane crash 
in Massachusetts. The court of appeals properly held that the Indiana 
two-year limitation applied in the present case, for Massachusetts did 
not have a sufficiently substantial interest in the recovery of damages 
from an Indiana defendant for its alleged negligence in Indiana. 
§lO.4. Life insurance contract: Alteration and misrepresentation 
in application. In Pahigian v. Manufacturers Life Insurance CO.,1 
the Supreme Judicial Court has again considered the question of what 
state's law should govern the rights created by a life insurance contract. 
On January 4, 1961, the insurance company (Manufacturers), a Ca-
nadian corporation doing business in Massachusetts, issued a life in-
surance policy to a domiciliary of Massachusetts. All the circumstances 
concerning the sale of the policy occurred in Massachusetts with the 
exception of the fact -that the home office of the defendant Manufac-
turers in Canada made up the policy and sent it to the Boston office. 
The premiums were paid by the insured up to the time of his death 
on February 7, 1962. When the defendant refused to pay the amount 
of the policy, the plaintiff beneficiary brought suit. 
Evidence introduced at the trial disclosed that the manager of the 
defendant's Boston office, to whom the application had been delivered 
after the insured had signed it, inserted the words "good recovery" 
after the words "usual childhood diseases" and that this was done 
without the knowledge or authorization of the insured. The evidence 
also revealed extended treatment and hospitalization of the insured 
for Hodgkin's disease which he failed to mention in his application. 
The trial judge ruled that the addition of the words "good recovery" 
constituted an alteration as a matter of law and brought into opera-
tion General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 131.2 The judge, having al-
lowed the plaintiff's motion to strike the application and all medical 
testimony from the record, directed a verdict for the plaintiff to which 
Manufacturers excepted. 
The Supreme Judicial Court resolved the conflict of laws problem 
in considering Manufacturers argument that General Laws, Chapter 
175, Section 131, was not applicable because the policy had been is-
sued at the company's head office in Canada. ~ that 
e~ything~cept ~rmal issuance of the policy had occurrea-in 
6 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §379 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1964). 
§1O.4. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 645, 206 N.E.2d 660. 
2 G.L., c. 175, §131, provides: "Unless a correct copy of the application is endorsed 
upon or attached to a policy of life or endowment insurance, When issued the 
application shall not be considered a part of the policy or received in eviden~ for 
any purpose. Every such policy which contains a reference to the application, either 
as a part of the policy or as having any bearing thereon, shall have endorsed thereon 
or attached thereto, when issued, a correct copy of the application." 
8
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Ma§sacbnsetts, conduded tbat "the CQRtract was a ~4auacbnsetts con-
tract':' Jt held, therefore, that Section 131 was applicable to the trans-
action. It further held, however, that the phrase "good recovery" was 
an immaterial alteration which did not require the exclusion of the 
insured's application and the medical testimony from evidence under 
Section 131. 
Massachusetts law also provides that misrepresentations by the in-
sured which are made with actual intent to deceive or which increase 
the risk of loss will enable the company to avoid the policy.s It has 
been held, moreover, that misrepresentation as to certain diseases does 
require, as a matter of law, the conclusion that the risk is increased:' 
The Court stated that Hodgkin's disease fell into the category of ill-
nesses which, as a matter of law, increased the risk of loss and that the 
insured's misrepresentations entitled the insurer to avoid the policy. 
The Court, therefore, sustained the exceptions and gave judgment for 
the defendant. 
The Court's opinion is significant with respect to the proper choice 
of law rules relating to the rights created by life insurance contracts. 
The usual position, following the traditional lex loci contractus rule, 
is that the validity, interpretation, and effect of a life insurance con-
tract are governed by the law of the place where it is made. Ii If tradi-
tional doctrine had been followed in the present case, it might have 
called for the application of Canadian law because the contract was 
probably completed there. The newer approach, which repudiates the 
mechanical use of the lex loci contractus, favors the application of the 
law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the 
insurance contract.6 The Supreme Judicial Court endorsed the Signifi-\ 
cant relationship approach in the present case when it determined that 
Massachusetts had the important contacts with the contract and that 
Massachusetts law, therefore, was controlling. 
Since the public policy expressed by insurance legislation is to pro-
tect the insured against the superior bargaining power of the company, 
the law of the state with the greatest interest in the insured should 
be applied to determine the rights of the parties. It is submitted that 
the Court's decision in the present case, giving full scope to Massachu-
setts public policy, is eminently correct. 
§IO.5. Modification of custody decree: Full faith and credit. The 
extent to which custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit is 
still an undecided question. Since custody decrees do not enjoy the 
same extraterritorial effect as do final judgments, the courts of a sec-
ond state have shown little hesitation in re-examining the decree of 
the state of rendition and in giving their own when the best interests 
8 G.L., c. 175, §186. 
~ See Merchants National Bank of Newburyport v. New York Life Insurance Co., 
1146 Mass. 745, 196 N.E.2d 201 (1964); Rainger v. Boston Mutual Life Assn., 167 Mass. 
109, 44 N.E. 1088 (1896). 
Ii See Leflar, Conflict of Laws 249-250 (1959). 
6 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §!I46h (Tent. Draft No.6, 1960). 
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of the child seemed to require this course of action. The decision of 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Jones v. Jones1 illustrates the freedom 
of action exercised by all courts in the child custody area. 
Abigail and Thomas Jones were married in New Hampshire. and 
then went to California to live. Wendolyn was born there on Apnl 23, 
1960. With the deterioration of the marriage it was decided that Abi-
gail and Wendolyn should tome to Massachusetts and visit with the 
paternal and maternal grandparents. They arrived in Massachusetts in 
June, 1961. Abigail decided to institute divorce proceedings in the 
Virgin Islands and Wendolyn was to remain with her paternal grand-
parents until after the divorce became final and her mother was set-
tled. Wendolyn lived with her paternal grandparents in Massachusetts 
since October, 1961. On December 18, 1961, the district court of the 
Virgin Islands granted a divorce to Abigail and gave her custody of 
the child. Thomas entered a general appearance arid submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the court. When Abigail continued to show indecision 
concerning her future life and Wendolyn's place in it, Wendolyn's pa-
ternal grandmother filed a petition for temporary custody in April, 
1963. This petition was assented to by the child's father and a decree 
granting such custody was entered. In May, 1963, Abigail filed a peti-
tion to revoke the temporary custody decree and the grandmother filed 
a petition for permanent custody. The probate court decreed that the 
grandmother should have custody of the child and Abigail appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the decree of the probate 
court, assumed that the court in the Virgin Islands had jurisdiction to 
decree the divorce and provide for the custody of Wendolyn.2 But the 
Massachusetts probate court had jurisdiction to enter the present de-
cree required by the needs of the child,S the foreign decree notwith-
standing. The Supreme Judicial Court, stating that the governing 
principle by which it must be guided was the welfare of the child,4 
found that the circumstances subsequent to the Virgin Islands decree 
justified the present decree changing custody. It concurred, therefore, 
in the conclusion of the probate judge that the child should remain 
in the custody of her grandmother. 
The Court rejected Abigail's contention that the decree of the pro-
bate judge violated the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.5~Full faith and credit does not require that a custod"y decree 
J!~$iY~!!Z!~'!~L~[e~tjIlt4e. forum st<ite th<iIl it ~niQ~_iIlJhest<i.tt!J~J . 
. rendition. _~!!.C:~L \!nder the law of the Virgin Islall<!s,.Jh~grjgiIgJ. c!e-
cree could have. be.~ll~odi!i,ed()n t4e.basis of II .s\!bsequent change in 
c:i!:c:y!!!stance~.!.he M~~~llc:lJ..!l~ettsEI"()bat~court could also modify this 
decree because of cha:l!g€.!<!_cQIl<:li.ti()!ls} 
§10.5. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 849, 207 N.E.2d 922, also noted in §9.2 supra. 
2 See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094, 92 L. Ed. 1451 (1948); Sherrer v. 
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087,92 L. Ed. 1429 (i948). 
8 See G.L., c. 208, §29; Welker v. Welker, 325 Mass. 738, 745-746, 92 N.E.2d 373, 
378 (1950); Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 478-479, 200 N.E. 395, 398-399 (1936). 
4 Jenkins v." Jenkins, 304 Mass. 248, 250, 23 N.E.2d 405, 406 (1939). . 
5 U.S. Const., Art. IV, §l. 
6 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 271-274 (4th ed .• , Scoles, 1964); Restatement of 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/13
§lO.6 CONFLICT OF LAWS 103 
The freedom of action in the child custody field, which all courts 
claim and use, is probably required in order to effect the "welfare of 
the child" rule. The resulting confusion in this area of conflicts law, 
however, is regrettable. 
§IO.6. Testamentary trust of movables: Testator's domicile at 
death governs. In B. M. C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Franzheim1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court applied the usual conflict of laws rule that a 
testamentary trust of interests in movables is construed in accordance 
with the law of the state in which the testator was domiciled at the 
time of his death. 
The testator created the trust in question by his will and he died 
domiciled in Rhode Island. The trust assets were at all times personal 
property and a Massachusetts trust company was designated as trustee. 
The testator made provisions for the termination of the trust and 
for a final distribution of the trust fund. Upon the termination of 
the trust under the terms of the will the trustee filed a petition for 
instructions concerning the distribution. The case was reserved and 
reported, without decision, to the Supreme Judicial Court by the 
probate judge. 
Since the testator had not designated the law of a particular state 
to govern the construction of his will, the Court ruled that the will 
was to be construed (in matters not relating to administration) in 
accordance with the law of Rhode Island where the testator had been 
domiciled at the time of his death. The Court thus applied the usual 
choice of law rule. pertinent to the construction of a will of movable 
property2 and the one endorsed by Massachusetts usage.s 
Although matters with respect to the administration of the trust 
were not in issue in the present case, the Court indicated that these 
were controlled by Massachusetts law. This conclusion followed from 
the fact that the testator, by designating a Massachusetts trust com-
pany as trustee, made it clear that he expected the trust to be admin-
istered in Massachusetts.4 
The Court, having disposed of the conflict of laws questions, then 
Conflict of Laws Second §117 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1953); id. §144a (Tent. Draft No.4, 
1957). See also New York ex reI. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 u.S. 610, 67 Sup. Ct. 903, 91 
L. Ed. 1133 (1947); Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 374, 82 N.E.2d 219, 229-230 (1948). 
The United States Supreme c.ourt has thus far refrained from determining the 
extent to which the full faith and credit clause precludes a consideration of circum· 
stances which have occurred prior to the entry of the initial foreign custody decree;:. 
See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 Sup. Ct. 273, 9 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962); Kovacs v. 
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 Sup. Ct. 96g;2 L. Ed. 2d 1008 (1958). 
§1O.6. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 931, 207 N.E.2d 913. 
2 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §1001, Comments e, f (Tent. Draft No. 
13, 1965); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 375-376, 391-392 (3d ed. 1963). 
S See Moore v. Cannon, 347 Mass. 594, 597, 199 N.E.2d 312, 314 (1964), noted in 
1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§4.2, 9.3; Second Bank·State Street Trust Co. v. Weston, 
342 Mass. 630, 635-636, 174 N.E.2d 763, 767 (1961), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§2.8, 8.2. 
, 4 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 318-319 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws Second §1004, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 13. 1965). 
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proceeded to construe the will under apposite Rhode Island law in 
order to determine the proper distribution of the trust fund. 
It is obviously desirable that a trust estate of personal property 
be treated as a unit and, to this end, that all the movables in the 
trust be controlled by a single law. For this reason the common law 
of conflicts ordinarily refers the matter of the construction of a will 
of movables to the law of the testator's domicile at his death; that 
is, the law with which he was presumably most familiar. Since, how-
ever, the purpose of rules of construction is to carry out the probable 
intention of the testator, a court may apply the law of some other 
state if it finds-the Supreme Judicial Court did not so find in the 
present case - that the testator intended that the rules of construction 
of that other state should be applicable. The element of uncertainty 
in this area of the law makes it desirable that the trust instrument 
clearly indicate what state's law is to govern the problem of construc-
tion. 
§IO.7. Forum non conveniens: Massachusetts cause of action dis-
missed. The owner of a transitory cause of action often has a choice 
of forums in which to sue. Some of these forums may have very little 
connection with the case because the cause of action sued upon 
occurred outside the state of forum and neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant resides in the state. The plaintiff, however, may bring suit 
in such a forum where he hopes to secure a larger award of damages, 
or where judicial procedure seems more favorable to him, or where 
the inconvenience of defending may induce the defendant to enter 
reluctantly into a settlement. In order to protect the defendant in 
these circumstances, the forum non conveniens rule has been devel-
oped whereby the court in its discretion will refuse to hear the case 
if it conceives itself to be a seriously inappropriate forum, as long as 
the plaintiff has a convenient forum elsewhere.1 
In Michels v. McCrory Corp.2 the Supreme Court, Special Term, 
of New York applied the doctrine forum non conveniens in dismiss-
ing a tort action where the accident occurred outside New York and 
neither party was resident in the state. The dismissal, however, was 
subject to conditions to preserve the rights of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff, a resident of Massachusetts, was injured in this Com-
monwealth. The defendant company, a Delaware corporation, was 
doing business in both New York and Massachusetts. The plaintiff 
first brought suit for damages in Massachusetts. Thereafter, the plain-
tiff voluntarily discontinued the Massachusetts action without preju-
dice and brought suit in the New York court, contending that New 
York's discovery and disclosure procedures were better suited to pro-
tect the interests of the parties. The defendant corporation moved 
for an order declining jurisdiction upon the grounds that the patties 
§1O.7. 1 Leflar, Conflict of Laws 87-90 (1959); see Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
Second §1l7e (Tent. Draft No.4. 1957); Stumberg. Conflict of Laws 166-170 (M ed. 
196!J). 
244 Misc. 2d 212. 25!J N.Y.s.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
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did not reside in New York and that the injury happened outside 
the state. 
The New York, court found that the case, involving a Massachusetts 
tort, could more conveniently be tried in Massachusetts. The plaintiff 
plainly was engaged in forum shopping since New York had only 
slight connection with the factual circumstances surrounding the suit. 
The court, in addition to calling attention to the locus delicti, noted 
the Massachusetts residence of the plaintiff and the Delaware incor-
poration of the defendant company. It concluded, therefore, that "the 
administration of justice will clearly be better served by not burden-
ing this court with this Massachusetts case." 
New York practice permits a court, in exercising its discretionary 
power to decline jurisdiction under the forum non conveniens rule, 
to impose appropriate conditions to safeguard the rights of the parties.s 
The court in the present case granted the defendants' motion with 
the following qualifications: 
The motion to dismiss is granted ... on condition that, on or 
before settlement of the judgment herein, defendant shall stipu-
late that in the event plaintiff infant commences a suit in the 
State or Federal Courts of Massachusetts within six months after 
the determination of all appeals from the judgment to be en-
tered herein or after the expiration of the time to appeal there-
from if no appeal be taken, defendant will waive any defense 
in such action of the statute of limitations and any defense based 
on the bringing and termination of the prior Massachusetts suit 
or this suit or both, and that in the event that within such period, 
the infant plaintiff seeks to vacate the discontinuance of the 
Massachusetts action and reinstate it, defendant will consent 
thereto.4 
The forum non conveniens rule is becoming increasingly important. 
The doctrine is now law in about half of the states!! and has been 
espoused by the Supreme Court of the United States.6 The principle 
of forum non conveniens also underlies the significant Section 1404(a) 
of the Judicial Code of 1948 which provides for the transfer of juris-
diction among the federal district courts.7 While the private interests 
of the litigants and factors of public interest justify the existence of 
the doctrine, an unfortunate result of its application is the delay 
which may bar the plaintiff's cause of action in other states owing 
to the running of the statute of limitations. The New York practice 
of conditional dismissal, as seen in the present case, is a desirable way 
of avoiding this difficulty. 
S See C.P.L.R., Rule 3211 (a)(2). 
444 Misc. 2d 212, 216, 253 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489·490 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
II Ehrenzweig Be Louisell, Jurisdiction in a Nutshell 52 (1964). 
6 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 
(1947). 
728 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1964). See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.1. 
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§lO.8. Validation of marriage statute: Extraterritorial effect. In 
Russo v. Art Steel CO.l the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, gave extraterritorial effect to a Massachusetts validation of mar-
riage statute to validate a marriage performed in New York. The case 
came to the court on appeal from a decision of the New York Work-
men's Compensation Board which had found that the claimant was 
the legal widow of the decedent. 
The deceased employee married the claimant in a ceremony per-
formed on February 9, 1935, in New York City. He had been previ-
ously married and had procured a divorce from his first wife in 
Massachusetts. The interlocutory decree was entered on October 4, 
1934, and did not become final until April 5, 1935.2 The claimant 
was unaware of her husband's prior marriage until about two months 
after their marriage. Immediately after the marriage the couple spent 
a few weeks living in Massachusetts. They returned to New York 
before the divorce decree became final and lived together as husband 
and wife for twenty-six years. Three children were born of the 
marriage. 
The general conflicts rule is that a marriage which meets the 
requirements of the state of celebration is valid everywhere.3 If, how-
ever, ~_.~~~~c~ decre~i:~U!!~erlocu!ory, ~.C?_that __ urior.:_!!l.a!!~<lg~_j~ _ no.t_ 
actually terminate4. unt~L~JJ:!!! the laps~_QLE:_ set $rjQd .QLtim~_-'l_ 
s~~ond marriag~~ould be bigamous i!mLinyalid.ey.erywhere.4 The 
f'New York marriage between the claimant and the decedent was, there-
U~~d .. 
There is a Massachusetts statute which provides for the validation 
of a marriage which takes place at a time when an impediment exists 
but where one of the parties acts in good faith and where the impedi-
ment is later removed.5 The Massachusetts decisions have made it 
clear that the statute is remedial in nature in order to protect persons 
who marry in good faith and to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy for 
innocent children when one parent is blameless of any conscious vio-
§1O.8. 121 App. Div. 2d 942, 251 N.Y.S.2d 238 (3d Dept. 1964). 
2 See G.L., c. 208, §21. 
3 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 228-231 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws Second §121 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1957); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 279-281 
(3d ed. 1963). 
4 Leflar, Conflict of Laws 310 (1959); Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §130, 
Comment b (Tent. Draft No.4, 1957). 
5 G.L., c. 207, §6, reads as follows: "If a person, during the lifetime of a husband 
or wife with whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage con-
tract with due legal ceremony and the parties thereto live together thereafter as 
husband and wife, and such subsequent marriage contract was entered into by one 
of the parties in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or wife was 
dead, that the former marriage had been annulled by a divorce, or without knowl-
edge of such former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has 
been removed by the death or divorce of the other party to the former marriage, 
if they continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on the part of 
one of them, be held to have been legally married from and after the removal of 
such impediment, and the issue of such subsequent marriage shall be considered as 
the legitimate issue of both parents." 
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lation of the marriage laws.6 The question before the court in the 
present case was whetherthe_.Y.2id New York.marr •. muld....he.:vali-
<late<JQY.J:he.Qp.~t'!tj9n oJ this Massachusetts statu~~. 
The New York court, finding that the conditions prescribed by the 
Massachusetts act had been met, ruled that "the Massachusetts statute 
has extraterritorial effect and can be applied to parties who are mar-
ried and live outside of Massachusetts." The marriage of the claimant 
and the decedent was validated by the statute after the interlocutory 
decree became final on April 5, 1935. The court held, therefore, that 
the marriage could be given effect for the purpose of granting work-
men's compensation death benefits and affirmed the decision of the 
Workmen's Compensation Board. 
The recognition by the New York court of General Laws, Chapter 
207, Section 6, was consistent with giving full faith and credit to the 
interlocutory nature of the Massachusetts divorce decree.7 The appli-
J:atiQn .. Qfthe_statute by the courtdid not. prejuclice any. interest. of 
l\{assaclJJJs~m,Ne.w.Yorkc::learlyhad the paramount interest in the 
5.t1lJJliL.of the claimant and a New York C()l!r:tf9~~ .. ilJ>plyM~~~a­
chusetts .. law to effect state. policy of protecting . innocent parties .~f 
·vOld-New York marriages. The net ·result of the court's decision was 
to make operative in New York the same liberal view followed in 
Massachusetts by its courts. 
6 See Vital v. Vital, 319 Mass. 185, 65 N.E.2d 205 (1946). 
7 See Arcand v. Flemming, 185 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1960). 
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